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Abstract
Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in
policy circles, where there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In
this paper, we demonstrate the relevance of demand elasticity to ignorance
by showing that small monetary incentives can significantly reduce ignorance.
We contrast monetary incentives with social norms, which have little impact
on ignorance and actually increase ignorance in less moral individuals. Using
a longitudinal design, we document that ignorance is persistent across moral
contexts and through time. We propose and structurally estimate a simple
behavioral model in line with our findings.
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1 Introduction
Ignorance allows individuals to engage more easily in questionable ethical behavior.
For example, consumers do not want to know whether a favorite product benefits
from child labor or causes damage to the environment, and they may even denigrate
others who pursue this information (Zane et al., 2016). Likewise, many art collectors
and museum managers ignore the origins of potentially stolen art work.1 In busi-
ness, it is not uncommon for managers to turn a blind eye to unethical behavior if
those suspected of it are top performers (e.g., Rayner, 2012).2 And in simple moral
dilemmas, individuals avoid costless information about the consequences of their
choices for others, thereby giving themselves “moral wiggle room” to act selfishly
(e.g., Rabin, 1995; Dana et al., 2007; van der Weele, 2014; Bartling et al., 2014;
Grossman, 2014; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Freddi, 2017; Golman et al.,
2017, for a review).
An important question is whether moral ignorance can be easily reduced with
monetary incentives or non-monetary incentives. This is a timely topic within policy
circles, where there is hope that it may be possible to foster integrity through non-
monetary tools (OECD, 2018), including “moral reminders” or “moral nudges.” But
despite all of the attention and all of the interest, little is actually known about the
effectiveness of different incentive types on moral ignorance.
In this paper, we study the elasticity of the demand for moral ignorance in re-
sponse to both monetary and non-monetary incentives, using social norms as a sort
of “moral nudge.” We show that monetary incentives, even if small, can significantly
reduce moral ignorance. This elasticity is significantly stronger than in situations
where no moral “good” is at stake. By contrast, social norms themselves have little
impact on ignorance. In fact, people confronted with moral dilemmas often decide to
avoid information, precisely because the information might pressure them to behave
morally – and against their own self-perceived interests. While social norms in-
crease the demand for information among those individuals who are likely to behave
morally, they decrease it among those who are not.
1For example, “The World Jewish Congress (WJC), a New York-based advocacy group, has
criticized museums for waiting for artworks to be claimed by Holocaust victims instead of publicly
announcing that they have suspect items” (Source: CNN.com, March 2, 2000).
2For example, Martin Winterkorn, former CEO of Volkswagen AG, argued that he would have
stopped the emissions scandal if only he had known about it earlier. Yet, investigations suggest
Winterkorn could have known already in 2007 (Source: USA Today, Jan. 19, 2017). In general, in
large organizations, a manager’s ability to know about other individuals’ ethical behavior may be
conveniently limited (Jackall, 1988; Dana, 2006).
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The elasticity of moral ignorance is thus unlike that of information that is morally
neutral and unlike that of moral behavior. It is also persistent across different
morally-relevant contexts and through time, as we document using a novel lon-
gitudinal design. These findings therefore shed light on important new patterns
regarding the malleability of ignorance, and have significant implications for policy
interventions aimed at decreasing moral ignorance.
To study moral ignorance, we develop a new experimental paradigm, the “moral
envelope game” (MEG). In this game, an individual chooses between an envelope
that may – or may not – contain a donation to a worthy charitable cause, and a
certain, private payment which the individual can pocket. We measure demand for
information by allowing the individual to learn (or avoid learning) the envelope’s
content before choosing between the envelope and the more selfish option. Opening
the envelope or leaving it closed is monetarily incentivized, with different prices
across a range of decisions.
To explain the demand for moral ignorance, we propose a parsimonious model
in which rejecting the donation comes with a moral cost (DellaVigna et al., 2012;
Andreoni et al. 2017). This moral cost may be absent (or much smaller) if the
envelope is closed, that is, if the donation is uncertain (Exley, 2015). Indeed, in our
study, individuals inclined to act selfishly preferred to remain ignorant about the
envelope’s content. The model yields several predictions that we test experimentally,
and can also be used to systematically examine the effects of different interventions.
This paper provides three main findings. First, we document significant elasticity
to monetary incentives. Most individuals pay in order to leave the envelope closed
and thus preserve their moral ignorance, as predicted in the model. This willingness
to pay for moral ignorance can be calibrated using information demand in a morally
neutral context, where the envelope contains a potential payment for the individual
instead. In these contexts, with morality not a consideration, most individuals are
willing to pay for information.
The demand curve for moral ignorance exhibits a sharp drop when moving from
small monetary costs to small monetary incentives to acquire information. Such
incentives can be an effective way of approaching people who have declined a request
for a donation and who fear that more information will add to their guilt and their
feeling of being pressured.
Second, we illuminate the complex interaction between social-norm information
and desired behaviors, such as charitable donations. Existing research on social
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norms has shown norms can often increase prosocial behavior (e.g., Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004; Schultz et al., 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson,
2009; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Our paper investigates, for the first time, whether
social-norm information is a powerful moral “nudge” to curb moral ignorance. In the
MEG, avoiding information about the donation opportunity and acting selfishly is
widely considered morally inappropriate, in contrast to obtaining information which
is considered morally appropriate.
There is no question that social-norm information increases the likelihood of
generous behavior among people who proactively seek out that information. The
problem – in effect quantified by our study – is that many people do exactly the
opposite. This raises important questions about the welfare effects of social-norm
information (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012; Allcott and Kessler, 2019). Next to affect-
ing the acquisition of information and donation decisions, social-norm information
may increase the moral costs of declining a certain donation in selfish individuals
and thereby increase the incentives of these individuals to avoid information, as we
document descriptively and using a structural model. This result suggests that in-
terventions based on social norms may come with the potential downside that moral
costs may increase.
Third, we document that moral ignorance in the envelope game is predictive of
ignorance in other decisions that have a moral component. Thus far, there has
not been much to demonstrate the external validity of experiments measuring in-
formation avoidance in moral dilemmas. We address that gap, by looking at how
our MEG participants approached the controversial question of industrial livestock
production. While consumers enjoy undeniable benefits from these production meth-
ods, they generally are not comfortable with the living conditions of the animals (te
Velde et al., 2002; ASPCA 2016; BMEL 2016) and tend to avoid information on
the topic (Onwezen and van der Weele, 2016).3 We decided to see how willing our
MEG participants were to get information on these farming methods, and then to
correlate their answers to their behaviors in the MEG game.
About a week after the MEG, the individuals who had participated were rewarded
for correctly answering questions regarding industrial livestock production, and were
offered the opportunity to watch an informative video beforehand. The results indi-
cate moral ignorance is persistent across both tasks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first experiment to provide suggestive evidence that preferring ignorance
3We follow Bandura (2016) in that avoiding unnecessary harm to humans, animals, and/or
nature is of moral relevance.
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in morally relevant decisions may be an individual trait that carries across moral
contexts.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, a rich literature doc-
uments that individuals often seek excuses to avoid charitable giving and other
prosocial behaviors. They avoid the charitable ask (e.g., DellaVigna et al, 2012;
Andreoni et al., 2017; Exley and Petrie, 2018) or sharing decisions (Dana, Cain and
Dawes, 2006; Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007; Lazear, Malmendier and
Weber, 2012), and exploit risk (Exley, 2015) or potential poor charity performance
(Exley, 2017) as excuses not to donate. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests in-
dividuals use news stories about high administrative costs and some charities’ high
salaries – ignoring information about the charities’ performance – as excuses not to
give at all.4 We study, for the first time, the elasticity of demand for information
about a charitable opportunity.
Second, moral ignorance has been widely studied within the moral wiggle-room
paradigm, in which an individual is unsure whether choosing the option yielding
a higher monetary payment for herself hurts or helps another individual. Dana et
al. (2007) were the first to show that individuals often avoid costless information
about the consequences of their choices (costless meaning information that is free
and a mere mouse click away) and are more likely to act selfishly as a result (see
also Larson and Capra, 2009; Matthey and Regner, 2011; Feiler, 2014). Previous
studies have considered the impact of a small (Grossman and van der Weele, 2017)
or a larger cost (Cain and Dana, 2012) on the demand for ignorance.
We study ignorance in a paradigm that is very different from the one used to
study moral wiggle room. While taking the own-payoff-maximizing option when
one is ignorant is considered morally appropriate in the moral wiggle room paradigm
(Krupka and Weber, 2013), it is not considered morally appropriate in the MEG.
Rather, in our game, the morally appropriate choice is to either open the envelope,
or choose the envelope, as it contains a potential donation. Taking the private
payment, by contrast, is morally inappropriate.
In effect, we are providing a new setting to study information avoidance, in which
ignorance is morally inappropriate and hence could be mitigated by non-monetary
interventions such as social norms. We systematically elicit the demand curve for
4“Charities have brought skepticism on themselves in some cases by spending large percentages
of donated funds on administrative costs and executive salaries. But this complaint is so commonly
expressed now that it’s starting to sound like a dodge for not giving rather than a principled
response to bad management at charities” (Source: The Globe and Mail.com, December 5, 2017).
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moral ignorance, and compare the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives
on ignorance. Another difference is in the connection we make to an unrelated moral
question, regarding animal welfare, which suggests that better understanding when
ignorance is morally inappropriate can have wide-ranging implications in a variety
of moral decision-making situations.
Third, recent surveys by Golman et al. (2017) and Hertwig and Engel (2016)
demonstrate that ignorance does not only occur in morally relevant situations, but
also in a variety of contexts, such as health (Oster et al., 2013; Ganguly and Tasoff,
2016), portfolio investment decisions (Karlsson et al., 2009; Sicherman et al., 2016),
or work situations (Huck et al., 2018). Our findings contribute to this large and
growing literature. We demonstrate that the moral relevance of the decision con-
text is important to understand, and that moral ignorance exhibits unique features
compared to other types of information demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We next describe the set-
ting in which information demand is studied and provide a parsimonious theoretical
framework. Section 3 describes the design of the two main experiments and the ad-
ditional experiment to measure the persistence of ignorance across contexts. Section
4 provides the results of the experiments, and section 5 discusses moral ignorance
across different contexts. Section 6 concludes.
2 Avoiding Morally Relevant Information
2.1 The Moral Envelope Game (MEG)
We study moral ignorance in the following game. An individual is assigned an
envelope that contains a $10 donation to the Malaria Consortium, a non-profit
organization fighting Malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, with p = 0.5. Otherwise (thus
also with p = 0.5), the envelope is empty. The individual makes two decisions. First,
she chooses whether to open the envelope or not. If she does not open the envelope,
she chooses between receiving $2.50 for herself and the uncertain envelope. If she
opens the envelope, she first learns whether the envelope contains the $10 donation
or no donation. Then, she chooses between the envelope and receiving $2.50 for
herself.
For comparison, we analyze two morally neutral games. Self-10 is identical to the
MEG, with the only difference being that instead of a donation, the envelope may
contain $10 for the individual. In Self-5, instead of $10, the envelope may contain
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$5.
2.2 Theoretical Background
We solve the MEG and contrast predictions with those for the morally neutral games.
We start with the case in which opening or leaving the envelope closed is costless,
then turn to the case with direct monetary incentives for opening the envelope or
keeping it closed. We also provide predictions on how social norms will influence
the decision to open the envelope. We refer to choosing to take the private payment
instead of the moral envelope as choosing the “selfish option,” and choosing the
moral envelope as “donating.”
We assume utility takes the form of u(x) = xr with risk parameter r > 0. As we
see, the predictions are independent of the risk parameter. Yet, they hinge on two
parameters. First, it matters how much the individual values the donation of $10,
which we capture by α ·10. The parameter α is thus a measure of altruism. Second,
information demand depends on the moral cost associated with rejecting the certain
donation of $10. Research has shown that rejecting a certain donation opportunity
can induce significant guilt or disutility, for example, from violating the social norm
to donate (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017; Ellingsen and Mohlin,
2019). We model this moral cost via a moral discount factor β. An individual who
rejects the certain donation gets β · 2.5 with β < 1, instead of 2.5. In other words,
rejecting the certain donation feels morally worse than rejecting an uncertain one,
and thus causes moral costs. Figure 1 provides the game tree.
When ignorance is costless, the main result is that moral discounting renders it
dominant for individuals with low levels of altruism to leave the envelope closed and
take the selfish option straight away. Only individuals with high levels of altruism
open the envelope.
Proposition 1 Consider the MEG when information is costless. In equilibrium,
individuals with α < 1
4
keep the envelope closed. Individuals with α ≥ 1
4
open
the envelope. After opening the envelope, individuals donate unless the envelope is
empty. After keeping the envelope closed, individuals choose the selfish option.
When avoiding or obtaining information entails a cost, behavior depends both on
the individual’s altruism and moral discounting. Suppose direct monetary incentives
mo for opening and mc for keeping the envelope closed exist, as shown in the game
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1
2
· u(α · 10)
donate
u(2.5)
take
close
u(2.5)
1
2 : empty
u(α · 10)
donate
u(β · 2.5)
take
1
2
: full
op
en
Figure 1: Game tree of the MEG when information is costless
tree in Figure 2. For simplicity, we focus on the case r = 1. In Appendix A, we also
address cases of risk aversion and of risk lovingness.
1
2
· u(α · 10 +mc) + 12 · u(mc)
donate
u(2.5 +mc)
take
close
u(2.5 +mo)
1
2 : empty
u(α · 10 +mo)
donate
u(β · 2.5 +mo)
take
1
2
: full
op
en
Figure 2: Game tree of the MEG with direct monetary incentives
Proposition 2 The equilibria of the MEG with monetary incentives mo,mc > 0
and r = 1 are as follows:
(i) If mo −mc ≤ −54 , individuals keep the envelope closed regardless of α.
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(ii) If mo −mc > 5
(
1
4
− β
4
)
, individuals open the envelope regardless of α.
(iii) In the intermediate case,
−5
4
< mo −mc ≤ 5
(
1
4
− β
4
)
,
a threshold value of αt ∈ (β4 , 12) exists such that individuals open if α ≥ αt, whereas
they keep it closed if α < αt. The value of αt is given explicitly through
αt =
1
4
− mo
5
+
mc
5
.
In the experiments, mo − mc ranges from -$2 to $2. Figure 3 depicts optimal
information demand and donation behavior depending on the price of information
and the level of altruism, for three cases of moral discounting. The level of altruism
generally determines whether individuals open the envelope or leave it closed (see
the transition from the green to the yellow area). If moral discounting is very strong,
selfish individuals pay to remain ignorant. If it is mild, they may open the envelope
and bear the moral costs when taking the selfish option (blue area). Individuals
who leave the envelope closed most frequently take the $2.50 payment, unless their
altruism is very high (α > 0.5), which we expected to be relatively rare.
(a) Very strong moral
discounting (β = 0.36)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(b) Strong moral
discounting (β = 0.66)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(c) Mild moral
discounting (β = 0.96)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mo -mc
α Open, Take
Open, Donate
Closed, Take
Closed, Donate
Figure 3: Optimal decisions for a risk-neutral individual with (a) very strong moral
discounting (β = 0.36), (b) strong moral discounting (β = 0.66), and (c) mild moral
discounting (β = 0.96), respectively.
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From Figure 3, one can infer the demand curve for information depending on
levels of altruism and moral discounting. To illustrate the demand curve directly,
Figure 4 shows the demand curve for information under the assumption that α
and β are continuously distributed, with α following a beta(1,3) and β a beta(3,1)
distribution. We observe a non-differentiability around a price of information of zero.
When ignorance is costly, β affects the slope of the demand curve. By contrast, when
obtaining information is costly, α affects the slope of the demand curve.
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Price of Information
Fr
ac
tio
n
D
em
an
di
ng
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Figure 4: Illustration of the demand for information, assuming α follows a beta(1,3)
and β a beta(3,1) distribution.
Our analysis thus leads to the following hypotheses that will guide the data
analyses. First, if individuals are rather selfish and exhibit moral discounting, they
forego incentives to open the envelope. This way, they can take the selfish option
without any moral costs.
Hypothesis 1 Individuals forego money in order to stay morally ignorant.
To evaluate the impact of the moral context on ignorance, we compare ignorance
in the MEG with the Self-10 and Self-5 games. In Self-10, the envelope contains
$10 for the individual. Altruism and moral discounting play no role, and hence the
Self-10 game is equivalent to setting α and β equal to 1 in the MEG. The same is
true for the Self-5 game, which is identical to Self-10 except that the envelope may
contain $5 instead of $10. It corresponds to the case of α = 0.5 and β = 1. In both
cases, individuals pay for information. See Appendix A for details.
Observation 1 In the morally neutral Self-5 and Self-10 games, individuals pay for
information.
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In the MEG, we expect a non-differentiability of the demand curve at zero, due
to the differential role of α and β.
Observation 2 In the MEG, the slope of the demand curve when avoidance is costly
is different than the slope when information is costly.
Next, we can examine heterogeneity in information demand and, as our analysis
shows, whether individuals demand or avoid information depends on their level of
altruism. Whereas individuals with low levels of altruism in the MEG pay to stay
ignorant, those who are significantly altruistic demand information even if it is costly.
Hypothesis 2 In the MEG, low levels of altruism correlate with a high willingness
to pay for moral ignorance.
As highlighted above, the MEG and the Self games are directly connected. Specif-
ically, individuals in the MEG who display an α of 0.5 should behave as individuals
in Self-5, whereas individuals in the MEG with an α of 1 should behave as individuals
in Self-10.
Observation 3 Individuals with very high levels of altruism in the MEG should
behave as individuals in the Self treatments.
In addition to the impact of monetary incentives, we study empirically the causal
effects of providing information about social norms. We expected these norms to be
in favor of opening the envelope and against taking the selfish option while leaving
the envelope closed. In terms of our model, we expected that social norms would
increase willingness to donate (WTD), leading to a higher level of altruism (α).
Such an increase could lead to more demand for information. Yet, social norms
could have a partially opposing effect if norms also increase moral discounting. If
so, individuals with still low levels of altruism would pay even more to stay morally
ignorant.
Hypothesis 3 Social norms may increase demand for information in rather altru-
istic individuals, but reduce information demand in selfish individuals due to stronger
moral discounting. If norm provision increases levels of altruism, an overall increase
in information demand becomes likely.
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3 Experimental Design
In the following, we present the designs of two experiments examining the impact of
monetary incentives (Experiment 1) and social norms (Experiment 2) on ignorance.
In total, we analyze the decisions of 1,304 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk).5 The design of the two experiments is summarized in Table 1. The
experiments were pre-registered. Throughout, we refer to analyses that were not
pre-registered as explorations of the data.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Experiment Treatments Description
1 MEG Donation uncertainty: $10 donation with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
Self-5 Payment uncertainty: $5 payment with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
Self-10 Payment uncertainty: $10 payment with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
2 Norms Elicitation of social norms regarding information demand
NoNorm MEG without norm information
Norm-Avoid MEG, avoidance (keep closed and take) is morally inappropriate
Norm-Seek MEG, seeking information (open) is morally appropriate
3.1 Experiment 1
In this experiment we study the effect of incentives on preferences for information.
Our main treatment is the MEG, in which the envelope contained a $10 donation
with a 50% chance. Individuals had to choose between one of three options: take
a $2.50 payment, take the envelope, or open the envelope first. Hence, the decision
setting contained no default choice (for an analysis of default effects, see Grossman,
2014). We varied the payment for opening the envelope from -$2 to $2. Specifi-
cally, each individual made nine independent decisions, with the following range of
payments for opening the envelope: $2, $1, $0.50, $0.10, $0, -$0.10, -$0.50, -$1 and
-$2.6
To benchmark preferences towards morally relevant information against such pref-
erences in a morally neutral context, we ran two control treatments (Self treatments).
5We used TurkPrime to run the studies and to re-invite subjects to the follow-up task (Litman,
Robinson and Abberbock, 2016). Further details are provided in Appendix C.
6Individuals knew that whether the envelope contained the donation or not independently varied
across all nine decisions. To simplify elicitation, decisions were made one at a time, on separate
screens, and the order of the questions always followed the same descending pattern of payments
for opening the envelope. The instructions are presented in Appendix B.
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In these, we replaced the uncertain donation with an uncertain payment for subjects
themselves. We designed the Self treatments to match average willingness to pay
for ignorance in the MEG with an equivalent willingness to pay for information in
the Self treatments.7 The question we answer is, what dollar amount placed in the
envelope in the Self treatments would result in a willingness to pay for information
of the same magnitude as the average willingness to pay for ignorance in the MEG
treatment? We first ran the Self-5 treatment in parallel with the MEG treatment.
We learned that the willingness to pay for information in Self-5 was lower than the
willingness to pay for moral ignorance in the MEG treatment. Thus, we ran the
Self-10 treatment.
3.2 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we study social norms regarding ignorance. A large number of
studies have shown that social norms affect individuals’ behavior in an array of
contexts (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Schultz et al., 2007; d’Adda et al., 2018).
In the context of donation behavior, injunctive-norm information, which describes
how individuals should behave, can increase prosocial behavior (e.g., Bicchieri and
Xiao, 2009; Hallsworth et al., 2017).
Thus far, no study has examined how information about social norms affects
information demand. Philosophers have proposed the “Ignorance Thesis,” which
states that if an individual chooses to remain ignorant in a moral decision, she is
culpable for acts that derive from it (Zimmerman, 1997; Rosen, 2003; Guerrero,
2007). If individuals broadly agree with this view within the MEG, we should find
injunctive norms in favor of information demand.
We expected that in our setting remaining ignorant and choosing the selfish pay-
ment would be considered morally inappropriate, because it implies that the subject
keeps $2.5 while forgoing a 50% chance of a $10 donation. At the same time, we
expected that it would be morally appropriate to remain ignorant and donate the
envelope, or to open the envelope first. We thus expected our setting to be sub-
stantially different from the moral wiggle room game in Dana et al. (2007) from
a moral perspective. In that game, choosing the own-payoff-maximizing option in-
creases the payoff of the decision maker by $1. This choice can yield $4 additional
dollars to another subject with a 50% chance, or decrease it by the same amount
with a 50% chance. Krupka and Weber (2013) find that ignorance while taking
7We thank Charlie Sprenger for suggesting this setup of the calibration exercise.
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the own-payoff maximizing option is considered morally appropriate, more so than
remaining ignorant and taking the option yielding a lower payoff.
We first ran the Norms treatment to elicit the perceived morality of informa-
tion and donation decisions, using the method proposed by Krupka and Weber
(2013). Subjects rated decisions as “very morally appropriate,” “somewhat morally
appropriate,” “somewhat morally inappropriate,” or “very morally inappropriate.”
Ratings were elicited for each of the nine information decisions, that is, for each
cost of information (avoidance). They earned $5 if their rating in a randomly drawn
decision coincided with the most frequently chosen answer of the other subjects in
that treatment, and zero otherwise.
On average, more than 70% of subjects considered it inappropriate (somewhat
or very inappropriate) to take the $2.50 payment without demanding information
first and more than 70% considered it (somewhat or very) appropriate to demand
information. Also, more than 70% of subjects considered it morally appropriate
to donate without demanding information. As we show, these beliefs did not vary
strongly by the price of information. Hence, this invariability allowed us to provide
to a new set of subjects simple information based on our norms elicitation.
We randomly allocated a new set of subjects to one of three treatments. The
first treatment was a NoNorm treatment, which was the same as the MEG treat-
ment in Experiment 1. The second was a Norm-Avoid treatment, in which subjects
were informed that over 70% of subjects considered taking the $2.50 payment to
be morally inappropriate, without seeking information first. The third treatment
was a Norm-Seek treatment, in which subjects were told that over 70% of subjects
considered seeking information to be morally appropriate.8 We hence tested two
simple messages regarding social norms, one positively and one negatively framed,
that could decrease moral ignorance. Each message was shown once, just before
subjects started making their information decisions.
3.3 Follow-Up: External Validity of Information Preferences
An important question when measuring ignorance in an experimental task is whether
such behavior is externally valid in a different incentivized setting. We are aware of
no evidence regarding the predictive validity of experimental measures of ignorance
8The message shown to subjects was “over 70% of MTurkers who evaluated the actions in this
part of the study consider it morally inappropriate (appropriate) to choose the option “Get $2.50”
without revealing what the envelope contains first (“Reveal what the envelope contains” first).”
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in a different context. To test the predictive power of the elicited informational
preferences, we later measured ignorance in a different, morally relevant task.
We invited subjects of our experiments to an unrelated work task between 7
and 10 days after they had participated in the experiments described above. The
task consisted of answering questions about the living conditions of cows and their
calves in conventional dairy production. We chose this topic because the willingness
to improve living conditions of farm animals correlates with a higher moral and
pro-social inclination (Albrecht et al., 2017). Even though many consumers buy
products from intense animal farming, many state that they do not agree with the
living conditions of animals involved (te Velde et al., 2002).
Subjects earned a $0.15 bonus if they correctly answered two questions about the
treatment of cows and their calves in conventional farming. Before proceeding to
the questions, they were offered the option to watch a 1-minute informational video.
We study whether subjects who choose to remain ignorant in the MEG also choose
to avoid watching the video.9
3.4 Experimental Procedures
3.4.1 Other Determinants of Ignorance
In all experiments, subjects first played the respective game in their treatment.
Thereafter, we elicited several control measures of subjects’ preferences.
As we saw in the Theoretical Background section, a subject’s valuation of the
donation (α) is particularly relevant for her decision whether to remain ignorant. To
measure this valuation, subjects participated in a task that elicited the monetary
equivalent of a $10 donation. Subjects made a series of eight binary choices in
each task, choosing between a payment that increased from $0.10 to $10 and a $10
donation. Their monetary equivalent, or willingness to donate (WTD), is measured
as the maximum payment that subject was willing to give up instead of the certain
donation.10
At the end, in a questionnaire, we elicited preferences for information (avoid-
ance) according to the Monitors-Blunters Scale (Miller, 1987), moral preferences
9In contrast to the MEG, here, repugnance (e.g., Roth, 2007) may play an additional role for
avoiding information. Nevertheless, we observe a marked correlation across the two contexts.
10They also made choices when the donation was uncertain, deciding between a payment that
increased from $0.01 and $5 and a 50% chance of a $10 donation. Subjects knew that the computer
either drew one of the two donation valuation tasks or the main part of the experiment for payment,
and that one decision in this task would be implemented.
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according the Machiavellianism scale (Christie and Geis, 1970), as well as gender,
age, education, and frequency of work in MTurk. The Monitors-Blunters Scale is
a well-established scale in psychology that measures information-seeking behaviors
under threat. A higher score on the scale implies more information-seeking be-
havior. We test whether subjects who express more desire for information in the
Monitors-Blunters Scale are less likely to remain ignorant in the MEG treatment.
The Machiavellianism Score measures whether a subject considers herself attached
or detached from moral and social norms. We test whether subjects classified as
more Machiavellian have a lower willingness to remain ignorant in the MEG treat-
ment.
In the Self treatments, we also elicited a control measure of subjects’ risk prefer-
ences. After subjects had completed the respective envelope game, we elicited their
risk preferences using a series of binary decisions between the envelope and a certain
payment. Because these treatments included no mention of a donation opportunity,
we did not measure subjects’ valuation of the $10 donation to fight malaria. We pro-
vide detailed information on these measures and descriptive statistics in Appendix
C.
3.4.2 Sample
Experiment 1 included 593 subjects, excluding inconsistent subjects as pre-registered.
Of these, 294 participated in the MEG treatment, 147 in Self-5, and 152 in Self-10.
In Experiment 2, we first conducted the Norms treatment, with 102 subjects. We
thereafter conducted the treatments NoNorm, Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek at the
same time and randomly assigned subjects to one of these three treatments. The
treatments contain 200, 201, and 208 subjects, respectively. These sample sizes were
chosen to be able to detect a $0.15 change in willingness to pay for information in
the presence of social-norm information (with an 80% power).
Because Experiment 2 was conducted two months after Experiment 1, we again
elicited the behavior of subjects in the MEG treatment, labeled NoNorm treatment
here, to control for any differences in the sample.11 We find that, in contrast to
Experiment 1, the share of female participants in Experiment 2 was significantly
higher, 53.0%, compared to 45.2% in Experiment 1 (t-test, p-value < 0.01).12 In
11We conducted a first smaller version of Experiment 2 that suggested results would be incom-
parable to the former MEG treatment run earlier. We hence conducted a larger study thereafter,
and focus on these data. Including the smaller study does not change the conclusions.
12Age, educational attainment, and MTurk experience of subjects did not differ (t-tests, p-value
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line with previous literature on gender effects in altruistic behavior (e.g., Andreoni
and Vesterlund, 2001), we observe a higher monetary equivalent of the $10 donation
in this experiment, $2.90, compared to $1.90 in Experiment 1 (t-test, p-value< 0.01).
We also observe a weaker preference to remain ignorant in the NoNorm treatment
than in the MEG treatment in Experiment 1 (t-test, p-value < 0.01), consistent with
our prediction (and finding) that a higher level of altruism is associated with a lower
willingness to pay for ignorance. The analysis of Experiment 2 hence focuses on the
treatment effect of providing information about social norms within this experiment.
On average, 86.3% of subjects in the experiments completed the follow-up task
in which we measured information demand about cows’ living conditions to exam-
ine the persistence of ignorance across tasks.13 Because the relationship between
ignorance in the envelope game and the follow-up task is qualitatively similar in
the MEG treatment in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2, we focus our analysis
on Experiment 2, where we can also examine whether social norms had a long-run
effect on ignorance.
Finally, a concern when running an experiment on ignorance, especially online, is
that subjects remain ignorant in order to save time. Obtaining information involves
only two additional clicks by the subject (selecting the envelope or the payment for
herself, and moving onto the next question), which takes very little time, whereas
direct incentives to obtain information can be very high (of up to $2). Indeed,
subjects who pay to remain ignorant do not finish earlier than those who do not.14
We also conducted a pilot experiment in a laboratory setting at UC San Diego. In
this pilot we find comparable rates of information demand. On average subjects
open the envelope in 38.6% of the decisions in Experiment 1 on MTurk (N=294), in
47.6% in Experiment 2 on MTurk (N=200), and in 48.7% in the laboratory (N=44).
> 0.05).
13The return rate is 83.7% in the MEG treatment in Experiment 1, 91% in the NoNorm treat-
ment in Experiment 2, and 87.6% and 84% in the Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatments, respec-
tively. Within Experiment 2, the difference in return rates between the Norm-Seek and NoNorm
treatments is significant (p-value = 0.036).
14The relationship between willingness to pay for ignorance and decision time in the experiment
is actually negative. We find that subjects who pay to remain ignorant take on average somewhat
more time than those who pay for information (Spearman rank correlation coefficient ρ = −0.1264,
p = 0.03).
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4 Results
4.1 Experiment 1: Price Elasticity of Ignorance
Figure 5 displays the share of subjects who demand information, that is, open
the envelope, for each price of information, by treatment. The bottom black line
depicts information demand in the MEG treatment. We observe that 31% of subjects
demand information when the cost of information is zero. This finding implies
that the majority, that is, 69% of subjects, prefer ignorance when it is costless.
Among these information avoiders, 65% are willing to pay at least 10 cents, and
57% are willing to pay more than 50 cents for moral ignorance. Further, 44% of
them are willing to pay at least $1, and 22% are willing to pay $2 for ignorance. This
result illustrates that, on one hand, introducing a small monetary cost of ignorance
increases information demand significantly, from 31% to 55%, i.e., 24 percentage
points. On the other hand, for a substantial proportion of subjects, preferences for
moral ignorance are strong. On average, across all subjects in the MEG treatment,
subjects pay 40 cents in order to stay morally ignorant. This amount is significantly
different from $0 (t-test, p < 0.01), and suggests moral costs of rejecting the certain
donation exist, in line with Hypothesis 1.
In the Self treatments, by contrast, we observe that subjects are, on average,
willing to pay for information acquisition. The average willingness to pay for infor-
mation in the Self-10 treatment is $0.83, and $0.29 in the Self-5 treatment. In both
cases, this amount is significantly different from zero (t-test, p < 0.01). The will-
ingness to obtain information in the Self-10 is higher than in the Self-5 treatment
(p < 0.01), in line with standard comparative statics of information preferences.
Hence, in a morally neutral context, subjects pay to obtain information, in line with
Observation 1.
The Self-5 and Self-10 treatments serve two further purposes. First, they allow us
to calibrate the magnitude of moral ignorance. Assuming linearity, we find willing-
ness to pay for ignorance in the MEG treatment is equivalent to willingness to pay
to obtain information when the envelope contains approximately $6 for the subject
with 50% chance, that is, a Self-6 treatment. A figure illustrating this equivalence is
provided in Appendix D. Second, the Self treatments allow us to identify the causal
effect of the moral context on ignorance. Our results indicate roughly half of igno-
rance at a cost of $0 is specific to the moral relevance of the situation (68.7% in the
MEG, compared to 34% and 25% in the Self-5 and Self-10 treatments, respectively).
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Figure 5: Information Demand, by treatment
To examine the elasticity of ignorance with respect to monetary incentives, we
estimate the slope of the demand curve. According to Observation 2, we can expect
differences in the slope of the demand curve at zero, when information becomes costly
to obtain instead of being costly to avoid. We conduct an exploratory analysis of
the differences in price sensitivity in the MEG, depending on whether information
is costly to avoid or to obtain, and compare it with that in the Self treatments in
Table 2. This table presents the results of linear probability models on the decision
to demand information, as a function of the price of information. The regression
includes an indicator variable for costly information, that is, when prices are strictly
positive, to examine how the demand curve changes around a price of information
of 0. To allow for the slope of the demand curve to vary when information is
costly relative to when it is costless, the regression also includes an interaction term
between the indicator for costly information and the price of information.
The results shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 display the relationship between
price and information demand in the MEG, Self-5 and Self-10 treatments, respec-
tively. Column (4) shows the effect of price is different in the MEG treatment,
compared to the Self treatments, in three ways. First, in the MEG treatment, we
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Table 2: Demand for Information Across Domains
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information Demand (Open envelope)
Treatment: MEG Self-5 Self-10 All
Price (of Information) -0.2159*** -0.1124*** -0.0902*** -0.2159***
(0.0130) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0130)
Costly Information -0.2751*** -0.0670** -0.0613** -0.2751***
(0.0234) (0.0271) (0.0242) (0.0234)
Costly Information X Price 0.1581*** -0.1499*** -0.1036*** 0.1581***
(0.0185) (0.0347) (0.0305) (0.0185)
Self-5 0.2371***
(0.0469)
Self-10 0.3398***
(0.0417)
Price X Self-5 0.1035***
(0.0213)
Price X Self-10 0.1257***
(0.0202)
Costly Information X Self-5 0.2081***
(0.0358)
Costly Information X Self-10 0.2138***
(0.0337)
Costly Information X Price X Self-5 -0.3081***
(0.0392)
Costly Information X Price X Self-10 -0.2617***
(0.0356)
Constant 0.4452*** 0.6823*** 0.7851*** 0.4452***
(0.0266) (0.0387) (0.0322) (0.0266)
Observations 2,646 1,323 1,368 5,337
R-squared 0.3117 0.2301 0.1641 0.3166
Nr. of subjects 294 147 152 593
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on information demand in the MEG, Self-10
and Self-5 treatments, using linear probability models. The dependent variable takes value 1 if
the subject demands information (opens envelope). Robust clustered standard errors shown in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
observe a pronounced drop of 27.51 percentage points when avoidance is no longer
costly. This drop is significantly different from the Self treatments which show more
demand for information and a smaller drop of 6.7 and 6.1 percentage points. The
drop in the MEG treatment is consistent with suggestive evidence in Grossman and
van der Weele (2017), who find information demand drops to zero when a 0.10 Euro
incentive is offered to avoid information, in an explorative session with 10 subjects in
the moral-wiggle-room paradigm of Dana et al. (2007). Second, when subjects are
paid to acquire information, price sensitivity is stronger in the MEG treatment than
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in the Self treatments. This difference is explained by the fact that most subjects
always demand information in the Self treatments, whereas many subjects exhibit
a preference to remain ignorant in the MEG treatment. Third, price sensitivity is
weaker in the MEG treatment than in the Self treatments when subjects have to
pay for information. Because only a few subjects have a preference to pay at all
for information in the MEG treatment, seeing a smaller elasticity here may not be
surprising.
4.1.1 Structural Estimation of Preferences for Ignorance
Because we find evidence of some ignorance in all treatments, one may wonder
whether some subjects made mistakes. Also, avoidance of instrumental information
as well as demand for non-instrumental information has been documented in past
research (e.g., Eliaz and Schotter, 2010). Therefore, we conduct exploratory analyses
that allow for noise in subjects’ behavior, and estimate the extent of altruism and
moral discounting structurally.
Using a nested logit model (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Ch. 15) for the
MEG treatment, we estimate average altruism (α) and moral costs (β), as well as the
CRRA parameter (r), as detailed in Appendix E. The results are shown in column
(1) of Table 3. We find the estimated α is 0.21 (s.d. = 0.01) and the estimated β is
0.90 (s.d. = 0.02), which is significantly smaller than 1 (p < 0.01), consistent with
significant moral discounting.
The estimated risk aversion (CRRA parameter) in the MEG treatment is 1.02
(sd=0.02). The degree of risk aversion in this treatment is thus not significantly
different from that in Self-5, where it is 0.97 (t-test, p=0.2221), as shown in column
(2) of Table 3, which is in line with the benchmarking exercise above.15
4.1.2 Behavior Conditional on Information Choices
In the MEG treatment, subjects who choose ignorance pick the selfish payment
in a large majority of cases (88.4%, on average). Subjects who choose to obtain
information exhibit a higher likelihood of giving. The share of subjects who donate
15Because little variation occurs in decisions once the envelope is open (less than 2% of subjects
choose a dominated option) in the Self treatments, we estimate a simple multinomial logit model.
The results of this estimation are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. Also, we note the CRRA
estimates obtained based on decisions in the envelope game in the Self-5 and Self-10 treatments are
very similar to those obtained when estimating CRRA coefficients from the control measures after
the envelope game, which are 0.77 (s.d. = 0.02) in the Self-10 treatment and 1.02 (s.d. = 0.02) in
the Self-5 treatment.
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Table 3: Estimation of Preferences for Ignorance
(1) (2) (3)
MEG Self-5 Self-10
Altruism parameter αˆ 0.2101
(0.0112)
Moral cost parameter βˆ 0.8982
(0.0256)
Risk aversion parameter (CRRA) rˆ 1.0289 0.9716 0.7771
(0.0258) (0.0335) (0.0291)
Loglikelihood -3297.09 -1109.09 -1153.51
Observations 2,646 1,323 1,368
Nr of subjects 294 147 152
Notes: This table presents structural estimation results for information demand
in Experiment 1. The estimation in column (1) is based on a nested logit
model, which includes an additional parameter ρ, which is a function of the
correlation between the error terms of decisions in the first stage (whether or
not to open the envelope) and that of decisions in the second stage (donation,
conditional on opening). The estimated ρ (and standard deviation) is 0.52
(0.07). Given the lack of variation in decisions after opening the envelope in
the Self treatments, the estimates presented are based on a multinomial logit
model. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in
parentheses.
when they learn the envelope contains a $10 donation increases from 49% to 100%,
as the price of information increases.16 This finding is consistent with selection, and
with the theoretical framework, as we detail in section 4.2.
In the Self treatments, conditional on demanding information, subjects choose
the envelope when it is full 99.2% and 99.0% of the time, in Self-5 and Self-10,
respectively. When it is empty, they choose the outside payment 98.0% and 99.4%
of the time, respectively. The latter findings confirm that subjects paid attention to
their decisions.17
4.2 Moral Ignorance and Willingness to Donate
Next, we test the relationship between the subject’s willingness to donate (WTD)
and her demand for information. First, we find a significantly negative relationship
16Detailed information on the distribution of information choices by price of information, as well
as behavior conditional on obtaining information, is provided in Appendix D.
17Subjects who do not demand information choose the $2.50 payment in 84.2% of the cases in
Self-5 and 63.7% of the cases in Self-10.
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between an subject’s monetary equivalent of the $10 donation (or WTD) and her
willingness to pay for information, as shown in Figure 6(a). The Spearman cor-
relation coefficient is -0.39 (p <0.01). This finding is consistent with Hypothesis
2.
Figure 6: Information Preferences and Donation Preferences
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We also classify our population into five subgroups, depending on the monetary
valuation of the donation, to explore the demand for information. Figure 6(b) shows
the information-demand curve for each subgroup. The darker curves indicate lower
monetary valuations for the donation, whereas the lighter curves indicate higher
valuations. In line with the theoretical framework, subjects who value the $10
donation less than the selfish option (WTD<2.5) often prefer to remain ignorant,
even if doing so is costly.
By contrast, subjects who value the $10 donation more than the selfish option
(75 out of 294) often choose to obtain information, even if it is costly. According to
Observation 3, subjects with a WTD of $10 should behave as in Self-10, and those
with a WTD of $5 should act like subjects in Self-5. Comparing those subjects who
display a WTD of 10 (N=26) in the MEG treatment and subjects in the Self-10
treatment, we find no difference in willingness to pay for information, which is $0.83
in both cases (p=0.9773). Comparing subjects with a WTD of $5 to the Self-5 does
not lead to any significant differences either, yet the number of subjects with a WTD
of $5 in the MEG treatment is small (N=8). In Appendix D, we provide further
detailed analysis of the behavior of subjects with a WTD above $2.50.
The theoretical framework also makes predictions regarding subjects’ decisions to
take the $2.50 payment or donate. To examine whether behavior in the experiment
is consistent with the model, we first examine how often subjects open and take
the private payment or open and donate, conditional on finding a donation in the
envelope, in Figure 6(c). In line with the theoretical framework subjects with higher
WTD choose to open and donate (orange triangles), whereas those with lower WTD
choose to open and take the private payment (blue circles). Next, in Figure 6(d), we
examine whether subjects choose not to demand information and take the private
payment or the envelope with a potential donation. Subjects with high WTD choose
to keep the envelope closed and donate more often (red triangles), whereas those
with lower WTD choose to keep the envelope closed and take the private payment
more often (green circles). Again, these patterns of behavior are broadly consistent
with our model.
In addition to the subject’s valuation of the $10 donation, several subject charac-
teristics may explain her willingness to pay for information. In Appendix D, we show
the Monitors-Blunters Scale is associated with ignorance, but we find no evidence
that the Machiavellianism scale or individual socio-demographic characteristics ex-
plain information choices.
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4.2.1 Drivers of ignorance
Our theoretical framework proposes that individuals suffer from moral costs when
rejecting a certain donation and these costs can drive ignorance. An additional
reason for ignorance could be that subjects presented motivated beliefs, which con-
tributed to ignorance. We added a measure of beliefs at the end of the envelope
game, in which we elicited subjects’ beliefs regarding the likelihood that the en-
velope contained a donation for a group of seven other subjects. We incentivized
correct answers with a $0.25 payment. We do not find evidence for self-serving
beliefs among those subjects who remain ignorant compared to those who do not.18
A further question is what is the source of moral discounting, which drives the
differential disutility from saying no to a certain donation in the model. Two poten-
tial sources are self-image concerns (e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011; Be´nabou, Falk
and Tirole, 2018) and having a minimal excuse to justify not giving because of un-
certainty of consequences (Exley and Kessler, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2017; Engel and
Szech 2018; Falk and Szech 2019). Keeping the envelope closed can potentially serve
as a justification for selfish behavior, because subjects can use it to explain their
behavior to others or expect others to use such excuses as well. As argued in Gross-
man and van der Weele (2017), a repeated choice context may provide little room for
self-image concerns, unless subjects engage in narrow bracketing. More than 84%
of subjects open the envelope in the first decision of the MEG. After opening, there
was a 50 percent chance they would be confronted with the donation opportunity
in this first decision. Among those who found a donation in the envelope in the
first decision, willingness to pay for avoidance turns out to be somewhat stronger
than that of subjects who were not confronted with the donation opportunity yet.
Precisely, the willingness to pay for ignorance in those who found a full envelope is
$0.29, compared to a willingness to pay for information of $0.08 for those who found
an empty envelope first. These amounts are significantly different from each other
(t-test, p <0.01). Thus, this result suggests that some subjects may have initially
underestimated their levels of moral discounting.
18We find that subjects who pay for ignorance are somewhat more likely to believe that the
envelope contains a donation than those who pay for information (Spearman rank correlation
coefficient ρ = −0.20, p < 0.001). This suggests that subjects who avoid did not self-servingly
believe that the envelope was empty.
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4.3 Social Norms Regarding Moral Ignorance
Experiment 1 focused on the impact of monetary incentives on moral ignorance and
documented significant elasticity. In Experiment 2 we investigate whether a non-
monetary incentive, such as social norms, can affect ignorance. First, we elicited
social norms regarding moral ignorance. Figure 7 displays the fraction of subjects
who consider taking the $2.50 payment without opening to be morally appropriate,
as well as the fraction who considers demanding information by first opening the
envelope to be morally appropriate. An action is defined as morally appropriate if
a subject considers it somewhat or very morally appropriate.19
Figure 7: Social Norms regarding Ignorance
On average, less than a third of subjects consider avoiding information and choos-
ing the $2.50 payment very or somewhat morally appropriate. By contrast, over 70%
19Alternatively, we could measure moral-appropriateness ratings by giving a value of -1 to a rating
of very morally inappropriate, a value of -1/3 to a rating of somewhat morally inappropriate, a
value of 1/3 to a rating of somewhat morally appropriate and a value of 1 to a rating of very
morally appropriate (see also, Krupka and Weber, 2013). The results are qualitatively similar.
Furthermore, we also elicited the moral appropriateness of choosing the envelope without knowing
whether it contains a donation for certain. A large majority of subjects consider such action
morally appropriate. Detailed results for all actions are presented in Appendix D.
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of subjects consider seeking information very or somewhat morally appropriate. In
Appendix D, we provide a detailed analysis of the price sensitivity of norms. Over-
all, the moral inappropriateness of each action in the envelope game shows relatively
little sensitivity to price. Hence, we use the average behavior to provide information
on social norms to a new set of subjects.
4.4 The Impact of Social Norms
Our second experiment addresses the question: Can social norms reduce moral
ignorance? Figure 8 depicts the demand curve for information when subjects receive
social-norm information and when they do not. Avoidance in the NoNorm treatment
is shown with the black solid line. Avoidance in Norm-Avoid is depicted by the
orange dashed line, and by the orange solid line in Norm-Seek.
Information demand displays a significant drop around $0 (of 32 percentage
points) in the NoNorm treatment, as in Experiment 1. The data thus confirm that a
shift from small monetary costs to small monetary rewards for seeking information
can affect moral ignorance in a pronounced and robust way.
Figure 8: Information Demand in Experiment 2, by treatment
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On average, we do not observe a significant effect of social norms on moral ig-
norance. Table 4 presents the results from estimating the effect of social norms on
ignorance We observe that ignorance decreases directionally by 1 to 4 percentage
points, a change that is not significantly different from zero.
Table 4: Information Demand in Response to Social Norm Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand Information (Open envelope)
Treatment NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek All
Price (of Information) -0.1922*** -0.1384*** -0.1351*** -0.1922***
(0.0151) (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0151)
Costly Information -0.3247*** -0.2941*** -0.2853*** -0.3247***
(0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0286) (0.0299)
Costly Information X Price 0.1006*** 0.0616*** 0.0288 0.1006***
(0.0247) (0.0221) (0.0234) (0.0247)
Norm-Avoid 0.0113
(0.0447)
Norm-Seek 0.0442
(0.0437)
Price X Norm-Avoid 0.0538***
(0.0207)
Price X Norm-Seek 0.0570***
(0.0203)
Costly Information X Norm-Avoid 0.0306
(0.0420)
Costly Information X Norm-Seek 0.0394
(0.0414)
Costly Information X Price X Norm-Avoid -0.0390
(0.0331)
Costly Information X Price X Norm-Seek -0.0718**
(0.0340)
Constant 0.5796*** 0.5909*** 0.6238*** 0.5796***
(0.0315) (0.0318) (0.0304) (0.0315)
Observations 1,800 1,809 1,872 5,481
R-squared 0.3460 0.2399 0.2579 0.2814
Nr of subjects 200 201 208 609
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on information demand in the NoNorm, Norm-Avoid,
and Norm-Seek treatments, using linear probability models. The dependent variable takes a value of
1 if the subject demands information (opens envelope). Robust clustered standard errors are shown in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Yet, we observe a positive effect of social norms on WTD. Specifically, the mon-
etary equivalent of the donation increases by $0.71 (t-test, p-value=0.06) and $0.68
(t-test, p-value=0.08) in the Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatments, respectively,
compared to the NoNorm treatment. In line with this result, we find that condi-
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tional on demanding information, subjects who learn the envelope contains a $10
donation donate 67% of the time in the NoNorm treatment, 77% in the Norm-Avoid
treatment, and 74% in the Norm-Seek treatment. The increase is marginally signifi-
cant (p=0.051 and p=0.063, respectively). This in turn increases the likelihood that
a donation is made in the MEG with social norms directionally. Compared to the
NoNorm treatment, the likelihood increases from 21.7% to 26.2% in the Norm-Avoid
treatment (p=0.052) and 24.2% in the Norm-Seek treatment (p=0.267).20
In terms of our model, we thus observe an increase in the subject’s WTD (i.e.,
an increase in α). Yet the impact on information demand is small. A reason is that
selfish subjects seem to have stronger preferences for ignorance than before.
Therefore, we explore the effects of social norms depending on whether informa-
tion is costly or not. The results are displayed in column (4) of Table 4. Price
sensitivity decreases significantly, by approximately 5 percentage points, when ig-
norance is costly, in both Norm treatments. Thus, a higher share of selfish subjects
foregoes sizable monetary payments in order to remain ignorant. By contrast, when
obtaining information is costly, subjects become less price sensitive through norm
provision (significantly so in the Norm-Seek treatment). For this range of prices, a
directional upward shift in the demand curve occurs, as altruistic subjects demand
information more often, even if it is costly.
Consistent with these findings, when we structurally estimate our theoretical
model in exploratory analyses, we find that subjects’ average altruism αˆ increases
from 0.21 in the absence of norm information to 0.24 and 0.22 in the Norm-Avoid
and Norm-Seek treatments (p =0.05 and 0.61, respectively), as shown in Table 5.
The estimated moral cost of rejecting a certain donation, βˆ, is 0.84 without norm
information in Experiment 2, and it decreases directionally to 0.82 and 0.79 in the
Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatments (p-value=0.59 and 0.26, respectively).
Taken together, we find that social norms increase WTD, in line with Hypothesis
3, but do not increase information demand overall. These effects suggest social
norms not only increase subjects’ valuation of the donation, but also the moral
cost of rejecting a donation, leading to partially offsetting effects of social-norm
interventions in still-selfish subjects.
20Detailed results regarding donation decisions when the envelope contains a donation and overall
likelihood of a donation, by price of information, are shown in Appendix D.
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Table 5: Estimation of Preferences for Ignorance with Norms Information
(1) (2) (3)
NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek
Altruism parameter αˆ 0.2156 0.2355 0.2213
(0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0082)
Moral cost parameter βˆ 0.8379 0.8165 0.7924
(0.0253) (0.0311) (0.0325)
Risk aversion parameter (CRRA) rˆ 0.9869 0.9188 0.9510
(0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0331)
Loglikelihood -2461.32 -2546.35 -2630.77
Observations 1,800 1,809 1,872
Nr of subjects 200 201 208
Notes: This table presents structural estimation results for information and donation
decisions in the Experiment 2. The estimation is based on a nested logit model, which
includes an additional parameter ρ, which is a function of the correlation between
the error terms of decisions in the first stage (whether to open or not the envelope)
and that of decisions in the second stage (donation, conditional on opening). The
estimated ρ (and standard deviation) is 0.68 (0.06) in the NoNorm treatment, 0.57
(0.07) in the Norm-Avoid and 0.69 (0.08) in the Norm-Seek treatment in Experiment
2. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses.
5 Persistence of Ignorance across Contexts
We have documented that information demand about a moral dilemma, such as that
studied in the MEG, is highly elastic to monetary incentives but rather inelastic to
social norms. An important question is whether information demand in the MEG
is predictive of information demand in other moral dilemmas. If so, individual
heterogeneity in the willingness to obtain information about moral dilemmas could
be seen as a persistent individual trait.
We examine information demand about animal welfare in dairy production, 7
to 10 days after individuals participated in the morally relevant envelope game.
We find that a majority of subjects (65%) choose to watch the informational video
about cows’ living conditions, and those watching the video answer the questions
correctly in 74% of the cases, compared to 24% when they do not watch it. The
main question is whether individuals’ willingness to pay for information in the MEG
predicts future demand for information in a different moral context, animal welfare.
Figure 9 shows a positive relationship between the likelihood of watching the video
and an individual’s willingness to pay for information in the envelope game.
Table 6 shows the results of a regression analysis of the relationship between
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Figure 9: Demand for Information across Tasks
willingness to pay to remain ignorant in the MEG and the choice to watch the
informational video. As can be seen, a $1 increase in the subject’s willingness to
pay for information increases the likelihood that she watches the video about cows’
living conditions by 5 percentage points.21 This relationship is not driven by the
subject’s altruism, as the regressions control for the subject’s WTD and this variable
has no predictive power on information demand regarding cows’ living conditions.
The rate of avoidance of the video varies depending on the social norms subjects
were exposed to in Experiment 2. In the NoNorm treatment, the share of subjects
who watch the video is 76.9%. It is 68.8% in the Norm-Avoid treatment, and
74.3% in the Norm-Seek treatment. As shown in column (2) of Table 6, the Norm-
Avoid treatment led to an increase in avoidance of the video. Although the effect
is comparatively small and exploratory, it suggests social-norm interventions should
carefully measure short-run as well as long-run impacts, to fully capture potential
spillovers onto information demand in other moral contexts.
21Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we study the relationship between the share of
correct answers to the questions about the video and ignorance in the donation setting.
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Table 6: Persistence of ignorance across contexts
Likelihood of watching video
about cows’ living conditions
Willingness to pay for information 0.0509*** 0.0500***
(0.0169) (0.0168)
Monetary equivalent of $10 donation (WTD) 0.0076 0.0087
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Norm-Avoid Treatment -0.0851*
(0.0457)
Norm-Seek Treatment -0.0460
(0.0465)
Observations 533 533
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from probit regressions on the likelihood of
watching the informational video about cows’ living conditions. The variable willingness
to pay for information is measured by the price of information at the point at which
the subject switches from demanding information to avoiding information. The variable
monetary equivalent of a $10 donation (WTD) is the subject’s willingness to donate as
measured after the envelope game. Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatment are treat-
ment dummies for the corresponding treatment in Experiment 2. All regressions include
controls for the subject’s gender, age, and educational achievement. Clustered standard
errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the elasticity of the demand for moral ignorance. Ignorance
often enables individuals to engage in questionable ethical decisions in a variety of
domains. Yet, little is known about how ignorance can be changed, using monetary
and non-monetary incentives.
In this paper we show that moral ignorance is highly elastic to monetary incen-
tives. Removing any (small) monetary costs of information and introducing small
monetary incentives for information seeking can reduce moral ignorance by more
than 24 percentage points. By contrast, larger monetary incentives have compara-
tively little impact on reducing moral ignorance and come at a much larger cost.
In policy circles, costless interventions such as moral “nudges” are often discussed
as interventions to reduce unethical behavior. Our findings with two different fram-
ings of social norms suggest social norms perform differently when applied to en-
couraging information demand, compared to encouraging ethical behavior. Moral
nudges in the form of social norms can increase moral behavior. Yet, their impact on
curbing moral ignorance is limited. Possibly, norm information increases the moral
costs from rejecting moral outcomes and thereby fosters ignorance in rather selfish
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subjects.
The elasticity of moral ignorance is therefore unlike the elasticity of morally-
neutral information demand and the elasticity of moral behavior. It is much more
sensitive to small monetary incentives than morally-neutral information demand.
At the same time, it is less responsive to social norms, compared to moral behavior.
Understanding the drivers of moral ignorance in the context of a donation de-
cision, as we do in the main part of this paper, not only provides insights about
information demand in the context of charitable decisions. Our follow-up experi-
ment shows that ignorance is persistent across time and onto other moral decisions,
such as animal welfare information. This suggests that our findings could provide
insights relevant to various domains of moral ignorance.
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Online Appendix
A Theoretical Analysis
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the MEG by backwards induction, using the
game tree depicted in Figure 1. We begin with the decision to take or donate after an
initial decision to open. In this case, taking the selfish amount if u(β ·2.5) > u(α ·10)
is strictly optimal. This condition is equivalent to α < β · 1
4
, due to the monotonicity
of u. At the other endnode, after an initial decision not to open, taking the selfish
monetary amount if u(2.5) > 1
2
· u(α · 10) is optimal. By our assumption that
u(x) = xr, r > 0, this condition is equivalent to α < 2
1
r · 1
4
. We can thus turn to
the initial decision to open the envelope and its dependence on α. The utility from
opening is22
1
2
u(2.5) +
1
2
u(β · 2.5) if α < β · 1
4
and
1
2
u(2.5) +
1
2
u(α · 10) if α ≥ β · 1
4
.
The utility from not opening is
u(2.5) if α < 2
1
r · 1
4
and
1
2
u(α · 10) if α ≥ 2 1r · 1
4
.
As β < 1 < 2
1
r , we thus distinguish three cases depending on the location of α. If α
lies below both thresholds, α < β
4
, donating is suboptimal regardless of the decision
22Here and in the following, we assume an agent who is indifferent between taking the money
and donating will donate. Similarly, the agent favors options with a higher donation probability
in case of indifference.
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in the first stage. In this case, the comparison
1
2
· u(2.5) + 1
2
u(β · 2.5) < u(2.5) (1)
implies leaving the envelope closed is optimal.23 In the intermediate case when
β · 1
4
≤ α < 2 1r · 1
4
, we have to compare the utility of 1
2
· u(2.5) + 1
2
· u(α · 10) from
opening and u(2.5) from leaving the envelope closed. Opening is thus optimal for
α ≥ 1
4
whereas leaving the envelope closed is optimal otherwise. In the third case
α ≥ 2 1r · 1
4
, the relevant comparison is between 1
2
·u(2.5)+ 1
2
·u(α ·10) and 1
2
·u(α ·10).
In this case, opening the envelope is optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The behavior at the endnodes is not affected by the
additional costs of opening or leaving the envelope closed. After opening and finding
a full envelope, the agent donates if α ≥ β
4
. If the envelope is kept closed, the agent
donates if α ≤ 1
2
.
For the initial opening decision, we distinguish between three cases, depending
on whether α < β
4
, α ∈ [β
4
, 1
2
), or α ≥ 1
2
. First, for α < β
4
, the relevant comparison
is now between a utility of 1+β
2
2.5 +mo from opening and 2.5 +mc from keeping it
closed. Opening is strictly dominant if the difference between mo and mc is positive
and sufficiently large,
mo −mc > 5
(
1
4
− β
4
)
.
Second, for α ∈ [β
4
, 1
2
), the comparison is between a utility of 2.5+α·10
2
+ mo from
opening and 2.5 +mc from keeping the envelope closed. Opening strictly dominates
if
mo −mc > 5
(
1
4
− α
)
. (2)
Otherwise, leaving the envelope closed is best. Observe the right-hand side of (2)
switches signs at α = 1
4
. Thus, if α < 1
4
, a positive value of mo −mc is needed to
motivate the agent to open the envelope. By contrast, for α > 1
4
, the agent will still
open the envelope when mc is slightly larger than mo.
In the third case α ≥ 1
2
, that is, for subjects with a very high valuation for the
donation, we have to compare 2.5+α·10
2
+mo from opening and
α·10
2
+mc from keeping
23In the boundary case β = 1, the agent is instead indifferent between opening and not opening.
This case is the only part of the analysis that changes for β = 1.
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the envelope closed. Opening strictly dominates if
mo −mc > −5
4
;
that is, unless mc is quite high, opening the envelope is best. 
A.2 Cases of Risk Aversion and Risk Lovingness
Individuals may have different risk attitudes. Intuitively, risk aversion makes the
closed envelope less attractive such that even under high monetary incentives, only
very altruistic subjects prefer the closed envelope. The following figure demonstrates
the case of u(x) =
√
x for different levels of moral discounting, β. If the moral
discounting is pronounced, even most selfish individuals prefer to leave the envelope
closed in order to avoid moral costs from rejecting the donation.
(a) Very strong moral
discounting (β = 0.36)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(b) Strong moral
discounting (β = 0.66)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(c) Mild moral
discounting (β = 0.96)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mo -mc
α Open, Take
Open, Donate
Closed, Take
Closed, Donate
Figure A.1: Risk Aversion: u(x) =
√
x; β = 0.36, 0.66, 0.96, respectively
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By contrast, the closed envelope can become quite appealing for altruists if they
are risk loving. The following figure illustrates that case.
(a) Very strong moral
discounting (β = 0.36)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(b) Strong moral
discounting (β = 0.66)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
(c) Mild moral
discounting (β = 0.96)
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mc -mo
α
-2 -1 0 1 20.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
mo -mc
α Open, Take
Open, Donate
Closed, Take
Closed, Donate
Figure A.2: Risk Loving: u(x) = x4; β = 0.36, 0.66, 0.96, respectively
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B Instructions
Below, we present the instructions for the MEG treatment in Experiment 1. The
Self-5 and Self-10 treatments had the same instructions except that the $10 donation
was replaced by a $5 or $10 payment for the individual. In Experiment 2, we added
information on social norms at the end of the instructions, as indicated in brackets
below.
In this study, you make decisions involving money for you and a donation to the
Malaria Consortium in your name.
Your donation takes place via an envelope.
The envelope either contains: a $10 donation on your behalf with 50%
chance, or no donation with 50% chance
page break
In this part, you do not know what the envelope contains. You decide
whether to get $2.50, get the envelope, or reveal what the envelope contains first.
You will make 9 decisions. In each decision you have three options:
(a) Get $2.50: then, you get $2.50.
(b) Get the envelope: then, you donate what the envelope contains, which you
do not know.
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains first: then, you are shown whether
the envelope contains a $10 donation on your behalf or no donation.
After being informed of the envelope’s content, you decide either to get $2.50
or get the envelope.
In each decision, you may receive an additional amount for choosing option
(c) ’Reveal what the envelope contains first’, or you may receive an addi-
tional amount for NOT choosing option (c), that is not ’revealing what the
envelope contains first’, and choosing options (a) or (b).
Across the 9 decisions, this additional amount you receive varies, from $2 for
revealing what the envelope contains to $0, and from $0 to $2 for NOT revealing
what the envelope contains.
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You will not know which is the ’decision that counts’ until the end of the study.
Because the computer is making a random draw, any of the choices could be the
’decision that counts.’ Therefore, you should think carefully about the choice you
make in each question.
page break
Remember, the envelope either contains:
a $10 donation on your behalf with 50% chance, or
no donation with 50% chance.
In what follows you will be shown an example and will be asked to answer several
questions, before making your decisions.
page break
EXAMPLE
As an example, let us consider question 5. In this question, you receive $0 for
revealing what the envelope contains, and $0 for not revealing what the
envelope contains. The question is shown below.
5. If you get $0 for revealing and $0 for not revealing what the envelope
contains first, what do you choose?
(a) Get $2.50
(b) Get the envelope
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains
If you choose ’(a) get $2.50’, you get $2.50.
If you choose ’(b) get the envelope’, you donate $10 with 50% chance or donate
$0 with 50% chance.
If you choose ’(c) reveal what the envelope contains’, you learn what is inside the
envelope. Two cases can then happen:
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1. The envelope contains a $10 donation on your behalf. Then you choose
between:
Get $2.50 or
Donate $10.
2. The envelope contains no donation. Then you choose between:
Get $2.50 or
Donate $0.
Thus, choosing (c) brings you to another choice. This choice is either
between a monetary amount for you and a donation on your behalf or
between a monetary amount for you and no donation in your name.
page break
CONTROL QUESTIONS
As an exercise, let us consider question 1.
The envelope either contains a $10 donation with 50% chance or no do-
nation with 50% chance.
In question 1, you receive $2 for revealing what the envelope contains. You
choose from these options:
(a) Get $2.50.
(b) Get the envelope.
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains (plus $2 for revealing what the envelope
contains).
Suppose you choose (a). What happens?
 I get $0
 I get $2.50
Suppose you choose (b). What happens?
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 I get $4.50
 I donate what is in the envelope.
Suppose you choose (c). What happens?
 I learn what is inside the envelope and then decide between the envelope and
$2.50. I either decide between a $10 donation on my behalf or $2.50 for me,
or I decide between a $0 donation or $2.50 for me. I also get $2 for choosing
to reveal what is in the envelope.
 I do not learn what is inside the envelope and get $0.
page break
Now you will make your decisions for this part.
In each question, the chance that the envelope contains a $10 donation is 50%. So,
the envelope’s content varies for each question according to chance.
One of your decisions may be the ’decision that counts’. So please decide carefully!
page break
[Treatment Norm-SeekInfo: NOTE: More than 70% of MTurkers who evalu-
ated the actions in this part consider it MORALLY APPROPRIATE to
choose the option ’Reveal what the envelope contains’ first.]
[Treatment Norm-AvoidInfo: NOTE: More than 70% of MTurkers who eval-
uated the actions in this part consider it MORALLY INAPPROPRIATE
to choose the option ’Get $2.5’ without revealing what the envelope con-
tains first.]
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C Elicitation of Control Measures
After the main part of the experiment, we elicited the monetary equivalent of a
certain $10 donation, by asking the individual to make eight binary choices between
the donation and payments to her that increased from $0.10 to $10. Each choice
between a private payment and the donation was presented in a separate screen, and
across screens the value of the private payment increased. Thereafter, we elicited the
monetary equivalent of a $10 donation that occurs with a 50% chance. Individuals
again made eight binary choices, each between the potential donation and a payment
that increased from $0.01 to $5. These choices were elicited in the MEG treatment
in Experiment 1 and all treatments in Experiment 2.
For each individual, we calculate her monetary equivalent of a certain (uncertain)
donation as the maximum value of the payment to her that she was willing to give up
instead of the donation. As shown in Table B.1., on average, individuals’ monetary
equivalent of a certain $10 donation was 1.91 (sd = 2.94), whereas it was 0.69
(sd = 0.89) for a 50% chance of a $10 donation in Experiment 1.
Table C.1: Control Measures and Sample Characteristics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Donation Self-5 Self-10 NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek
Monetary equivalent of:
(1) $10 Donation Mean 1.91 - - 2.92 3.60 3.56
SD 2.94 3.48 3.78 3.92
(2) $10 Donation/Self
payment, with p = 0.5
Mean 0.69 1.40 2.59 0.78 0.81 0.72
SD 0.82 0.76 1.83 0.88 0.97 0.89
Subject characteristics
Female Mean 45.9% 42.9% 46.7% 55.0% 51.2% 52.9%
Age Mean 36.5 37.6 35.3 36.3 35.6 38.0
High school graduate Mean 40.5% 30.6% 44.1% 36.0% 31.8% 33.2%
On Mturk 7 days a week Mean 92.5% 91.8% 90.8% 89.0% 86.1% 91.8%
In the Self 5 and Self 10 treatments of Experiment 1, we elicited the certainty
equivalent of a $5 and $10 payment that occurred with a 50% chance. We asked
the individual to make eight binary choices between the uncertain payment and
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payments to her that increased from $0.50 to $5 in the Self 5 treatment, and $1 and
$10 in the Self 10 treatment. On average, the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance
of $5 was 1.40, and that of a 50% chance of $10 was 2.59.
The second part of Table B.1. displays the characteristics of subjects who par-
ticipated in Experiment 1 and 2, including gender, age, high school graduates, and
intensity of work at Amazon Mechanical Turk.
C.1 Details of MTurk assignments
We used TurkPrime to invite individuals to participate in our studies on MTurk, and
re-invite them for the follow-up task. In Experiments 1 and 2, individuals always
received a fix payment of $3, in addition to their earnings from the experiment.
The criteria to participate were that they should be located in the US and have
an approval rate of at least 80%. The median time to complete the study was
approximately 20 minutes, and more than 96% of subjects who started completed
the experiment.
D Additional Results
D.1 Distribution of information choices in Experiments 1
and 2
Table D.1 below presents the distribution of choices in Experiment 1. For each price
of avoidance, we show the percentage of individuals who (a) avoid and choose $2.50
(“Choose $2.50”), (b) avoid and donate (“Choose envelope”), (c) seek information
(“Open envelope”).
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Table D.1: Distribution of Choices in Experiment 1
Treatment
Price of information Donation Self-5 Self-10
-$2 Choose $2.5 14.6% 7.5% 2.6%
Choose envelope 1.0% 2.0% 2.6%
Open envelope 84.4% 90.5% 94.7%
- $1 Choose $2.5 28.6% 18.4% 6.6%
Choose envelope 2.0% 2.0% 3.3%
Open envelope 69.4% 79.6% 90.1%
- $0.50 Choose $2.5 36.7% 21.8% 10.5%
Choose envelope 2.7% 4.1% 4.6%
Open envelope 60.5% 74.1% 84.9%
- $0.10 Choose $2.5 42.5% 23.1% 13.8%
Choose envelope 2.7% 5.4% 5.9%
Open envelope 54.8% 71.4% 80.3%
$0 Choose $2.5 62.6% 25.9% 15.1%
Choose envelope 6.1% 8.2% 9.9%
Open envelope 31.3% 66.0% 75.0%
$0.10 Choose $2.5 72.8% 34.0% 19.1%
Choose envelope 9.2% 6.1% 11.2%
Open envelope 18.0% 59.9% 69.7%
$0.50 Choose $2.5 77.2% 42.2% 21.7%
Choose envelope 10.2% 7.5% 13.2%
Open envelope 12.6% 50.3% 65.1%
$1 Choose $2.5 76.5% 59.9% 30.9%
Choose envelope 12.9% 9.5% 18.4%
Open envelope 10.5% 30.6% 50.7%
$2 Choose $2.5 76.5% 76.2% 42.1%
Choose envelope 17.3% 12.9% 23.7%
Open envelope 6.1% 10.9% 34.2%
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Table D.2 below presents the distribution of choices in Experiment 2.
Table D.2: Distribution of Choices in Experiment 2
Treatment
Price of information NoNorm NormAvoid NormSeek
-$2 Choose $2.5 5.0% 12.4% 9.1%
Choose envelope 2.0% 4.0% 4.8%
Open envelope 93.0% 83.6% 86.1%
-$1 Choose $2.5 16.5% 19.4% 15.9%
Choose envelope 4.0% 4.5% 5.3%
Open envelope 79.5% 76.1% 78.8%
-$0.50 Choose $2.5 19.5% 21.4% 19.2%
Choose envelope 5.5% 7.5% 5.3%
Open envelope 75.0% 71.1% 75.5%
-$0.10 Choose $2.5 26.0% 24.9% 24.5%
Choose envelope 6.5% 8.5% 5.8%
Open envelope 67.5% 66.7% 69.7%
$0 Choose $2.5 49.0% 42.8% 41.3%
Choose envelope 7.0% 9.5% 8.2%
Open envelope 44.0% 47.8% 50.5%
$0.10 Choose $2.5 58.5% 53.7% 51.0%
Choose envelope 15.5% 16.4% 14.9%
Open envelope 26.0% 29.9% 34.1%
$0.50 Choose $2.5 61.5% 53.7% 52.9%
Choose envelope 17.5% 19.9% 18.3%
Open envelope 21.0% 26.4% 28.8%
$1 Choose $2.5 64.5% 56.7% 60.1%
Choose envelope 22.0% 23.9% 19.7%
Open envelope 13.5% 19.4% 20.2%
$2 Choose $2.5 64.5% 57.7% 61.5%
Choose envelope 27.0% 26.9% 24.5%
Open envelope 8.5% 15.4% 13.9%
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D.2 Illustration of calibration in Experiment 1
Figure D.1 illustrates the equivalence between the MEG treatments and the Self-5
and Self-10 treatments, as discussed in the main text. The black connected line
shows the willingness to pay for information in the Self treatments. The red line
indicates the willingness to pay for ignorance in the MEG treatment.
Figure D.1: Benchmarking Ignorance in MEG treatment to Information Demand in
Self Treatments
D.3 Behavior conditional on information demand in Exper-
iments 1 and 2
Individuals who choose to seek information learn whether the envelope actually
contains a donation. If subjects learn the envelope is empty, they choose the $2.50
payment to themselves in 93.5% of the cases. If subjects learn the envelope contains
a $10 donation, between 49% and 100% choose the donation, as shown in Table D.3.
Consistent with selection of those who value the donation opportunity highly into
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seeking information, the share of those who donate increases as the cost of ignorance
decreases.
Table D.3: Behavior Conditional on Seeking Information in Experiment 1
(a) (b)
Envelope contains $10 Donation Envelope contains nothing
Price of information % choose envelope N % choose envelope N
-$2 49.2% 126 5.7% 122
-$1 50.5% 101 1.9% 103
- $0.50 52.1% 94 4.8% 84
-$0.10 51.3% 78 2.4% 83
$0 74.5% 47 6.7% 45
$0.10 87.1% 31 4.5% 22
$0.50 96.0% 25 16.7% 12
$1 93.3% 15 6.3% 16
$2 100.0% 7 9.1% 11
Notes: This table shows the percentage of individuals choosing the envelope in two cases: (a) when
the envelope contains a $10 donation and (b) when it is empty. In each case, we also show the
number of observations.
Table D.4: Behavior Conditional on Seeking Information and Finding Donation in Experi-
ment 2
Percentage choosing envelope if envelope contains $10 donation
Donation-NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek
Price of avoidance % choose envelope N % choose envelope N % choose envelope N
$2 56.8% 88 66.7% 81 65.6% 93
$1 62.3% 77 65.3% 72 70.3% 74
$0.50 68.1% 72 68.8% 77 67.9% 78
$0.10 61.8% 68 74.0% 77 67.2% 64
$0 72.0% 50 80.3% 61 78.2% 55
-$0.10 90.9% 22 100.0% 31 97.0% 33
-$0.50 83.3% 18 100.0% 28 85.3% 34
-$1 91.7% 12 100.0% 18 95.0% 20
-$2 92.3% 13 100.0% 15 90.9% 11
Notes: This table shows the percentage of individuals choosing the envelope when the envelope contains a
$10 donation in each treatment in Experiment 2. In each case, we also show the number of observations.
D.4 Donation likelihood in Experiment 2
In Figure D.2 we show the likelihood that a donation is made in each treatment of
Experiment 2. The likelihood of a donation stems from two decisions. First, the
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individual donates after opening the envelope and finding a donation inside. Second,
the individual donates without opening the envelope.
Figure D.2: Likelihood of a donation in Experiment 2
D.5 The determinants of information demand in the MEG
treatment
In Table D.5, we examine the determinants of information preferences in the MEG
treatment. In addition to the individual’s willingness to donate, one important
preference is the individual’s value of a $10 donation that occurs only with a 50%
chance. To measure how much the individual’s value drops when uncertainty cannot
be removed, we compare the monetary equivalent of a $10 donation with certainty
and the one with a 50% chance. If the equivalent with uncertainty is less than half of
the equivalent with certainty, we classify the individual as risk averse (with respect
to the donation). We do not observe that the change in the donation valuation
when it is uncertain, relative to when it is certain, is related to information demand.
Additional characteristics that could explain information decisions are the score on
the Monitors-Blunters Scale and the Machiavellianism scale, as well as gender, age,
education, and frequency of work on MTurk. We find the Monitors-Blunters Scale
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is associated with ignorance, but we do not find evidence that the Machiavellianism
scale or individual socio-demographic characteristics explain information choices.
Table D.5: Determinants of Information Demand in the MEG treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Willingnes to pay for information
Monetary equivalent of $10 donation 0.1625*** 0.1653*** 0.1640***
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0213)
Risk averse 0.1168 0.0992 0.0942
(0.1485) (0.1482) (0.1496)
Monitors-Blunters Scale Score 0.0273** 0.0277**
(0.0135) (0.0138)
Mach IV Score 0.0416 0.0291
(0.1179) (0.1227)
Female -0.0623
(0.1206)
Age 0.0005
(0.0056)
High school degree or higher -0.0744
(0.1188)
Works every day on Mturk 0.0479
(0.2232)
Constant -0.7416*** -0.9966*** -0.9651**
(0.0715) (0.3518) (0.4721)
Observations 294 294 294
R-squared 0.2014 0.2130 0.2147
Notes: This table examines the determinants of willingness to pay for information in the
MEG treatment. The dependent variable takes values from -2 to 2, depending on when
the individual chooses to switch from obtaining information to not obtaining information.
The monetary equivalent of a $10 donation is the individual’s valuation of the donation.
Risk averse is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual values a donation
opportunity with a 50% chance less than half of her monetary equivalent of a certain
donation. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
D.6 Detailed analysis of the demand for moral ignorance in
altruistic subjects
When we examine the behavior of subjects with a WTD between 2.5 and 7.5 shown
in Figure 6(b), we see a significant drop in information demand to the right of $0,
which we do not observe in the Self-5 treatment.
This drop could be due to two reasons. The first is risk preferences in the donation
domain. If individuals are sufficiently altruistic and risk seeking, when information
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becomes costly, they could prefer to donate the closed envelope. Through the lens
of the model, we should only see this preference for larger costs of information. In
the data, though, among individuals who do not demand information as soon as
it becomes costly, only about a third of the subjects (31.4%) decide to donate the
closed envelope.24
The second reason for the drop to the right of $0 may be a change in social
norms. Though not captured in our model, one could imagine costs of information,
even if tiny, provide some excuse for staying ignorant. We collect data on the moral
norms regarding ignorance. These norms turn out to be rather inelastic to the
price of information. Nevertheless, information demand is considered somewhat less
important when information becomes costly. This norm change may contribute to
the drop around $0 for subjects who have a high valuation for the certain donation.
D.7 Norm-elicitation results in Experiment 2
Table D.6 shows individual ratings of moral appropriateness of each action, for each
price of avoidance. Panel A focuses on the choice to avoid and choose $2.50. Panel
B focuses on the choice to avoid and donate by choosing the envelope. Panel C
focuses on the choice to seek information, by opening the envelope.
24Among the selected sample of individuals who no longer demand information when it costs
$0.10, we find that 30 individuals choose the $2.50 payment, whereas 9 choose the closed envelope.
To examine whether those subjects who switch to the closed envelope are relatively risk loving
with respect to the donation, we explore the ratio of their valuation of the donation with certainty,
relative to their valuation of the donation with uncertainty. A risk-neutral individual would exhibit
a ratio of 2. We find that, on average, the ratio for all subjects is 2.33 (s.d. 2.78). For the subjects
who switched, it is 1.74 (s.d. 0.66). Thus, indeed, we find some indication of risk lovingness in
these subjects.
56
Table D.6: Individual Ratings of Moral Appropriateness of Each Action
Moral Appropriateness Category Rating
Very morally Somewhat morally Somewhat morally Very morally
inappropriate inappropriate appropriate appropriate
Price of information PANEL A. Choose $2.50
-$2 38.24 38.24 18.63 4.9
-$1 39.22 37.25 16.67 6.86
-$0.50 40.2 30.39 23.53 5.88
-$0.10 38.24 32.35 18.63 10.78
$0 36.27 30.39 24.51 8.82
$0.1 41.18 30.39 19.61 8.82
$0.5 38.24 34.31 19.61 7.84
$1 40.2 32.35 17.65 9.8
$2 43.14 31.37 17.65 7.84
Total 39.43 33.01 19.61 7.95
Price of information PANEL B. Choose envelope
-$2 0.98 3.92 54.9 40.2
-$1 0 6.86 55.88 37.25
-$0.50 0 6.86 54.9 38.24
-$0.10 2.94 5.88 50.98 40.2
$0 1.96 7.84 47.06 43.14
$0.1 0 9.8 44.12 46.08
$0.5 2.94 6.86 48.04 42.16
$1 0 7.84 50 42.16
$2 0.98 9.8 41.18 48.04
Total 1.09 7.3 49.67 41.94
Price of information PANEL C. Open envelope first
-$2 1.96 8.82 45.1 44.12
-$1 0.98 9.8 46.08 43.14
-$0.50 0.98 8.82 48.04 42.16
-$0.10 0.98 9.8 42.16 47.06
$0 1.96 5.88 47.06 45.1
$0.1 3.92 17.65 43.14 35.29
$0.5 2.94 10.78 55.88 30.39
$1 6.86 10.78 49.02 33.33
$2 7.84 12.75 45.1 34.31
Total 3.16 10.57 46.84 39.43
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Table D.7 presents the results of a linear probability model on the evaluation
of each action as morally appropriate. The regression models include an indicator
variable for costly information, that is, when prices are strictly positive, to allow
for a kink around $0. The regressions also include an interaction term between the
indicator for costly information and the price of information, to allow for a differ-
ent effect of price on moral appropriateness, depending on whether information is
costly. The moral appropriateness of demanding information does not vary signifi-
cantly with the price of information, but it exhibits a kink around a price of $0. If
information is costly, demanding information is 8 percentage points less likely to be
considered morally appropriate.25
Table D.7: Moral Appropriateness
(1) (2) (3)
Morally Appropriate
Action: Get $2.5 Demand Information All
Price (of Information) 0.0450** 0.0087 0.0087
(0.0181) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Costly Information -0.0257 -0.0827** -0.0827**
(0.0241) (0.0346) (0.0346)
Costly Information X Price -0.0595** -0.0170 -0.0170
(0.0297) (0.0243) (0.0243)
Get $2.5 -0.5955***
(0.0492)
Price X Get $2.5 0.0362
(0.0219)
Costly Information X Get $2.5 0.0570
(0.0458)
Costly Information X Price X Get $2.5 -0.0425
(0.0366)
Constant 0.3108*** 0.9063*** 0.9063***
(0.0440) (0.0233) (0.0233)
Observations 918 918 1,836
R-squared 0.0033 0.0150 0.3564
Nr. of subjects 102 102 102
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on the likelihood that getting $2.50 (private
payment) and demanding information is considered very or somewhat morally appropriate, using
linear probability models. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the individual considers
getting $2.50 (private payment) or demanding information very morally appropriate or somewhat
morally appropriate. Robust clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
25This result provides a potential explanation for the drop in information demand when price
increases from $0 to $0.10, documented in Experiment 1.
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In the Norms treatment, we also elicited the moral appropriateness of donating
versus acting selfishly. When faced with a certain $10 donation, 78% of individuals
consider it morally inappropriate not to donate. When faced with a 50% chance of a
$10 donation, 66.7% consider it morally inappropriate not to donate. These results
are broadly in line with existing research evaluating social norms around sharing
decisions (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013).
E Structural Estimation
We structurally estimate the parameters of our theoretical model, using the exper-
imental decisions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. As in our model, we assume
individuals have CRRA utility, with risk-aversion parameter r, such that u(x) = xr.
When individuals donate, they value the donation with α. When they choose the
selfish option, knowing the envelope contains a certain donation, they suffer from
the (additional) moral cost β. Because the decision structure of individuals involves
two steps, we estimate a nested logit model, with three branches (for details, see,
e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Ch. 12.6.2). Two branches are degenerate. First,
if the individual decides to take the selfish payment of $2.50 without opening, we
denote the utility by V c,0. Second, if she takes the envelope without opening it, we
denote the utility as V c,1.
The third branch is the choice to open the envelope. Then, knowing whether the
envelope is full or empty, the individual decides whether to take the envelope. To
specify the likelihood, denote the decision to take the envelope as d ∈ {0, 1}. The
utility of d, conditional on opening, is V d,f , where f indicates whether the envelope
is full or empty. The likelihood of opening and taking the envelope is
po,d = po × pd|o = exp (ρI
o)
exp(ρIo) + exp(V c,1) + exp(V c,0)
× exp (V
d,f/ρ)∑
d
∑
f exp (V
d,f/ρ)
,
where Io = ln(
∑
d
∑
f exp (V
d,f/ρ)), which is known as the inclusive value. The
likelihood of leaving the envelope closed and taking it is
pc,1 =
exp (V c,1)
exp(ρIo) + exp(V c,1) + exp(V c,0)
,
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and the likelihood of leaving the envelope closed and taking the $2.50 payment is:
pc,0 =
exp (V c,0)
exp(ρIo) + exp(V c,1) + exp(V c,0)
.
In all estimations, we include the payoff of the decision or resulting donation as well
as the individual’s show-up fee. This approach avoids negative payoffs in the rare
cases where the individual opens the envelope and chooses the empty envelope.
The estimation of the nested logit includes an additional parameter, ρ, which
is a function of the correlation between the error term in the decisions in the first
stage (whether to open or not the envelope) and the error term in the decisions in
the second stage (donation, conditional on opening). This parameter is noted in the
footnote of Tables 3 and 5. Because ρ enters multiplicatively in the utility of choosing
between the envelope (with a donation or not) and the outside payment of $2.50, it
cannot be separately identified from a Fechner error (see, e.g., von Gaudecker et al.,
2011). Hence, we do not explicitly add Fechner errors to the model, and interpret ρ
with care.
To further examine the coherence of the estimated risk-aversion parameters in
the Self treatments, we also estimated the implied CRRA parameters from the
control measures, elicited through simple binary decisions, after the main part of the
experiment (for a more detailed description see Appendix C). The estimated CRRA
parameter from those decisions in the Self-10 treatment is 0.77 (sd=0.02), and that
in the Self-5 treatment is 1.02 (sd=0.02). Hence, these parameters are closely in line
with those estimated from the decisions in the main part of the experiment.
Finally, we note that we have explored the results of structural estimation when
including all subjects, as well as those who were inconsistent in their decisions.
We find the results remain qualitatively similar, and that the effects on social-norm
information are strengthened (leading again to an increase in the altruism parameter
and an increase in moral costs, measured as smaller β).
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